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Abstract
Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites?
In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as in-
surance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that
negligibly small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisment,
via coalition formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in
discontinuous changes in equilibrium surplus division. Our results are robust to public good
provision following enfranchisement when there is preference heterogeneity over the location of
the public good across the di¤erent elites. We conclude with a comparative analysis of Indian
democracy and show that our model is able to account for some of the distinctive features of
Indian democracy.
Keywords: enfranchisemnt, elite, non-elites, conict, bargaining, risk-sharing, Indian democ-
racy.
JEL Classication: D72, D74, O57.
1 Introduction
Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? Moore
(1964) argues that a fundamental precondition for franchise extension is the power balance be-
tween landed upper class and urban bourgeoisie; while totalitarian regimes arise whenever one
class dominated the others. Bardhan (1984) emphasizes the capacity of the democracy to manage
the conict between elites:
In a country where the elements in the dominant coalition are diverse, and each su¢ ciently
strong to exert pressures and pulls in di¤erent directions, political democracy may have slightly
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better chance, than in other developing countries,(...). This is based not so much on the strength
of the liberal value system in its political culture as on the procedural usefulness of democracy as
an impersonal (at least arbitrary) rule of negotiation, demand articulation and bargaining within
coalition, and as a device by which one partner may keep the other partners at the bargaining table
within some moderate bounds(p.77).
And Olson (1993) notes:
We can deduce (...) that autocracy is prevented and democracy permitted by the accidents of
history that leave a balance of power or stalemate- a dispersion of force or resources that makes
it impossible for any leader or group to overpower all of the others".
Examples illustrating this phenomenon, can be drawn from very di¤erent historical and eco-
nomic conditions. In the UK for example, the political environment left after the glorious rev-
olution was characterized by an harsh competition between di¤erent interests.1 In contrast in
countries like Germany, Japan or Italy, ...a commercial and industrial class which is too weak
and dependent to take the power and rule in its own right [...] throws itself into the arms of the
landed aristocracy and the royal bureaucracy. (Moore (1964), pp. 435-437). In India, where
the level of fragmentation and socio-lingustic heterogeneity result in a lack of a clearly dominant
elite, the democratic system is reasonably stable. On the contrary, Pakistan, characterized by a
dominant ruling elite, did not enjoy the same period of democratic stability.2
In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as insur-
ance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly
small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisement, via coali-
tion formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in discontinuous
changes in equilibrium surplus division.
In our model, the relative bargaining power of each elite is expressed as the fraction of the
available surplus that it is able to appropriate for itself if the bargaining breaks down and surplus
destruction occurs. We assume that the relative bargaining power of each elite is uncertain
and before uncertainty is resolved, the two elites can unanimously agree to enfranchise a weak
but numerically large non-elite. Once the enfranchisement decision has been made, the relative
bargaining power of the two elites determined and is revealed each of them although the non-elite
only observe a noisy signal. All enfranchised agents, then, propose and vote over surplus sharing
1For example, Olson (1993) writes. There were no lasting winners in the English civil wars. The di¤erent
tendencies in Bristish Protestantism and the economic and social forces with wich they were linked were more or
less evenly matched.
2 In the last section we provide a more detalied discussion on Indian democracy and the comparison with Pakistan.
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proposals with the outcome determined by majority voting. Once the outcome of majority voting
is known, the non-elite learn the true relative bargaining power of the two elites and either the
stronger elite or any other coalition of two classes can object to the winning proposal. At this
point, ex-post renegotiation and bargaining begins.
In this paper, franchise extension to the non-elite has two distinct consequences: (a) as only
enfranchised classes are able to vote, once enfranchised, the non-elite both make, and vote for,
surplus sharing proposals, and (b) once enfranchised, the non-elites bargaining power is higher
relative to the weaker elite than with the stronger elite. Under these conditions, we show that
at the ex-post bargaining stage, only with enfranchisement do the non-elite form a coalition with
the weaker elite in order to counterbalance the power of the stronger elite. Once enfranchised, at
the voting stage of the game, only an imperfectly informed non-elite will make a surplus sharing
proposal that, constrained by the possibility of ex-post renegotiation, doesnt extract too much
the available surplus and as a consequence, both the elites, ex-ante, are unanimously agree to
franchise extension. Therefore, in a sense, it is the very weakness of the non-elites, both in terms
of relative bargaining power and information, which makes them suitable to become an impartial
arbiter between the two competing elites.
Our theory also yields some insight on the issue of direct transfers vs public good provision in
a democracy. Specically, in an extension of our main model, we show that enfranchisement will
lead to direct transfers (via surplus sharing) rather than public good provision when the degree
of preference heterogeneity across the two elites over the location of the public good is high.
Our results on enfranchisement are linked only to the conict resolution and surplus sharing
among the elites and we abstract from any issue related to class complementarity or interest
alignment between sections of the elites and non elites, which normally follows the modern cap-
italistic development (Galor and Moav 2006). Our results suggest that enfranchisement is not a
necessary e¤ect of the modern economic development. Recent empirical evidence questions the
link between democracy and development, the so-called "modernization theory"3. As Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, Yared 2005 show, after introducing the country xed e¤ects, the previously
observed (Barro 1999 for example) strong causal e¤ect of income on democracy disappear. Fur-
thermore, there are some important counter examples demonstrating that this link does not imply
neither a necessary nor a su¢ cient causality relationship. ODonnel (1973) already argued that
3 In the political science literature, this theory was fuelled by the a celebrated article of Lipset (1959) and has
been subsequently criticised by Luebbert (1991), ODonnel (1973) among others. In the economics literature,
Lizzeri and Persico (2004), LLavador and Oxoby (2005), have developed this argument. In section 2 (see below),
we present a more detailed description of the recent economic literature on the argument.
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the collapse of democracy in Latin-America in the 1960s and 1970s undermined the condence in
the modernization-promoted democracy. Similarly, as we discuss later in the paper, the Indian
experience (at least till the late 1980s) provides an example of a relatively stable democracy in
an economy with low per capita incomes and endemic mass poverty.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the related literature on this
enfranchisement and democracy. In section 3, we present the main model. Sections 3-5 are
devoted to analyzing the equilibria of this model while section 6 studies the extension to case with
public goods. Finally, section 7 is devoted to a comparative analysis of the Indian democracy.
2 The related literature
While to the best of our knowledge, both the model and the results we obtain in this paper are
new, in what follows we relate what we do to the existing economic literature.
In Acemoglu and Robinson (1998), franchise extension abstracts away from the issue of intra-
elite conict. Moreover, in their paper, voting outcomes conditional on enfranchisement are
irreversible and cannot be renegotiated4. As a consequence, in their paper, enfranchisement is a
long-term commitment to redistribute from the elites to the non-elites, under threat of revolution.
In our paper, in contrast, voting outcomes conditional on enfranchisement are never irreversible
and enfranchisement occurs only with weak non-elites.
Lizzeri and Persico (200-) and Llavador and Oxoby (2004) study franchise extension with intra-
elite conict where enfranchisement results due to an alignment of interests between sections of the
elite with non-elites. In Lizzeri and Persico (200-), the alignment of interests is due to public good
provision, like education and health, for an urban, industrial production, while in Llavador and
Oxoby (2004) the alignment of interests is due to the common economic interests between urban
workers and capital owners. An implication of these papers is that enfranchisement is inherently
linked to western capitalistic development. In contrast, in our paper, no exogenous technological
change is needed to generate the coalition among classes leading the full enfranchisement. This
allows us to consider the democratization process as independent from the modern capitalistic
development5.
4Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) partially relax this assumption, making that the decision of enfrachisment
reversible but costly.
5Other models of franchise extension emphasize the idea of enfranchisement as a commitment device and include
Conley and Temini (2001), Bertocchi (2003), Fleck and Hanssen (2002). From a di¤erent perspective Ticchi and
Vidigni (2003) show how elites enfranchise citizen in case of war to increase their incentives to ght.
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Moreover, unlike us, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) do not consider the possibility of renegotiating
the voting outcome in the regime of restricted franchise. In fact, if renegotiation of the voting
outcome is allowed with limited enfranchise, then, in their paper, franchise extension is no longer
a necessary condition for public good provision6. In our paper, electoral results, with and without
franchise extension, can always be renegotiated7. Implicitly, in the Lizzeri and Persico paper,
some degree of democracy is already accepted, and the elites are already committed to accept
the electoral verdict (with and without franchise extension), like the Britain "Age of Reform". In
contrast, here, our aim is to provide an explanation where the creation of democratic institutions
starts without any such commitment8.
Our result that public good provision will not occur with enfranchisement when the degree of
preference heterogeneity across the two elites over the location of the public good is high, is di¤er-
ent from, but complementary to Lizzeri and Persico (2001) where the impact of di¤erent voting
systems (majority voting vs proportional representation) on public good provision is studied.
3 Transfers and enfranchisement
The model has three time periods, t = 0; 1; 2. There are three classes of homogeneous agents:
E1; E2;W , where Ei, i = 1; 2, represents the two elite classes and W represents the non-elite.
There is a surplus of Y which has to be shared between the three classes. Individuals in each
class consume the surplus at t = 2. Preferences over consumption are represented by the utility
function u : <+ ! < where u0(:) > 0 > u00(:) which implies that individuals are strictly risk
averse. The total number of individuals has a mass of 1; with the mass of W larger than 12 . For
simplicity we assume that the size of E1 and E2 are equal.
6 In order to illustrate this point we adapt an example already used by Lizzeri and Persico (200-). Let 1 be
the social surplus to be allocated to a one-unit population and G > 4 the value of a public good that can be
produced with the social surplus. A political party can win the election by redistributing when it needs to acquire
only x  0:25 votes. This implies that the enfranchised, say e; are less than 0:5: On the other hand a party can
win by supplying the public good when e > 0:5. This result, however, relies on the assumption that the part of
the elite who do not receive any transfer, e   x; will accept this outcome, without being able to renegotiate. If a
form of renegotiation is allowed, the promise of the winning party to redistribute the entire surplus to its voters
is not credible. Therefore, the provision of the public good can be a winning strategy even without the franchise
extension.
7Simillarly, in Llavador and Oxoby (2004), one section of the elite can decide to enfranchise a section of the
non-elite even when other sections of the elite have an incentive to prevent further franchise extension.
8For example the Indian extension of franchise, decided just after its Indepency in 1946, can be considered more
a one-shot decision rather than a gradual process (see last section for more details).
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Initially, only classes E1 and E2 are enfranchised. Franchise extension to W has two distinct
consequences: (a) as only enfranchised classes are able to vote, once enfranchised W is able to
both make and vote for surplus sharing proposals, and (b) there is an innitesimal change in W 0s
bargaining power in a manner that will be made clear the following paragraphs.
Let   = ffWg ; fE1g ; fE2g ; fW;E1g ; fW;E2g ; fE1; E2gg denote the set of all admissible
coalitions. A key feature of our analysis is the bilateral bargaining between di¤erent coalitions of
classes. The relative bargaining power of a coalition is determined by the share of the available
surplus it is able to appropriate for itself if bargaining breaks down. Since some of the available
surplus will be lost, we can interpret the breakdown of bargaining as a civil war.
In what follows we will characterize the bargaining power of each class or coalition of class.
Let  = f1; 2g, be a random variable that determines the relative bargaining strength of each
coalition in a bilateral bargain with some other coalition. We assume that  is determined by the
nature at the beginning of t = 1; as follows:
 =
8<: 1 prob. 122 prob. 12 :
For each  2  , let   () denote the set of admissible coalitions which excludes any class already
contained in 9.
The relative bargaining power of a coalition is determined according a disagreement function
d;0() (respectively, ~d;0()) that associates a disagreement share to each pair of coalitions ,0,
0 2   (), with enfranchisement (resp., without enfranchisement). The following assumptions
on the disagreement functions d;0(), ~d;0() characterize the relative bargaining power among
classes and the nature of the enfranchisement:
1. For each ,  and 0 2   (), both ~d;0() + ~d0;() < 1 and d;0() + d0;() < 1;
2. For each ,  such that either E1 2  or E2 2 , and 0 2   (), ~d;0() = d;0();
3. For  = i, i = 1; 2 and j 6= i, there exists " > 0 but close to zero such that dfEig;fEjg (i) >
" > dfEjg;fEig (i);
4. For each , 0 2   (W ), ~d0;fWg; () > ~dfWg;0 () = 0, while given  = i, and i = 1; 2 and
j 6= i, dfWg;fEig (i) = dfWg;fE1;E2g (i) = 0 but there exists " > 0 but close to zero such that
0 < dfWg;fEjg (i) < ".
9Formally, for any two classes c; c0 2 ,   () = f0 2   : c 2 0 or c0 2 0g.
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5. For each , and i; j = 1; 2, j 6= i, dfEj ;Wg;fEig () > dfEig;fEj ;Wg (); moreover, 12 >
dfEig;fEj ;Wg (i) > 0 and dfEjg;fEi;Wg (i)  dfEjg;fEig (i).
Assumption 1 formalizes the idea that in any bilateral bargain, some of the available surplus
is lost if bargaining breaks down.10 Assumption 2 states that the bargaining power of any coali-
tion that contains either E1 or E2 doesnt depend on whether or not there is enfranchisement.
Assumption 3 states that the bargaining power of Ei, relative to Ej , j 6= i, is at its strongest
when  = i: in this case, we say that the state of the world favours Ei and Ej is the weaker elite.
However, note that as  has equal probability of being either 1 or 2, the two elites E1 and E2 are
ex-ante symmetric. Assumption 4 states that irrespective of the state of nature, W has the weak-
est bargaining power relative to either E1 or E2. However, conditional on enfranchisement, W 0s
bargaining power, relative to the weaker elite, increases marginally while W 0s bargaining power,
relative to the stronger elite, remains unchanged.11 Finally, Assumption 5 states a coalition of
either one of the elites with W has greater bargaining power relative to the excluded elite. Specif-
ically, even when  favours Ei, the coalition of Ej , j 6= i, with W has greater bargaining power
relative to Ei; moreover, by assumption 2, this is the case with and without enfranchisement.12
The sequence of events is as follows:
 Ex-ante enfranchisement : At t = 0, the set of voters is determined. We assume that only
the classes E1; E2 are enfranchised as voters and are represented by their respective political
parties. However, by unanimous consent, both classes E1; E2 can also decide whether or not
to enfranchise W .
 Interim majority voting : At the beginning of t = 1, nature chooses . Both E1 and E2
observe  but W receives a noisy signal  about  so that conditional on  = i;
 =
i with prob. q
j; j 6= i with prob. 1  q
(1)
10Coherently with a situation of civil war.
11The numerically larger non elite is weak because is unable to organize and solve a collective action problem.
However, enfranchisement can marginally solve this problem since W 0s ability to act collectively increases as mem-
bers of W organizes a party for the election. We can think of a small part of W starts to be organized and obtain a
small power of pressure. Obviously , this small power of pressure result is higher, in relative terms, with respect of
the weakest elite than with the stronger elite. For notational simplicity we then assume that the power of W with
respect to the strongest elite is 0, but it could perfectly be positive as far it is smaller than the power against the
weakest elite.
12We can think that one elite can organize the non elites solving their collective action problem. In this case the
coalition, given its numerical overwhelming superiority, become very strong.
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such that 12  q < 1: Conditional on natures choice and signal , each enfranchised class
proposes a sharing rule  = (E1 ; E2 ; W ) of the surplus Y: The set of voters then vote
between sharing rules and the sharing rule with highest number of votes wins.13 If the
winning proposal from the voting stage is accepted, the game ends and all classes consume
their share of the surplus Y according to victorious sharing rule.
 Ex-post bargaining : At t = 2;  is fully revealed to all classes. If after observing the sharing
rule chosen in the preceding period, conditional on  = i, if either Ei or any coalition of
two classes objects, the winning proposal from the voting stage is rejected. If Ei alone has
objected, Ej , j 6= i and W decide whether or not to form a coalition. If no coalition is
formed, with equal probability, either (i) Ei bargains rst with Ej and then with W or
(ii) Ei bargains rst with W and then with Ej . If Ej , form a coalition, rst they bargain
with Ei and then with each other. If two classes form a coalition to reject the winning
proposal, then, rst, the two classes, bargain with the excluded class and then, bargain with
each other over the surplus appropriated in the preceding round of bargaining. Once all
bargaining has concluded, the game ends and each class consumes its share of the surplus
Y .14
At the ex-post renegotiation stage, at each step, bargaining is sequential and in any bilateral
bargain, the class or coalition whose relative bargaining power is higher makes a "take-it-or-leave-
it" o¤er to the weaker class. Further, we assume that a coalition of two classes forms if and
only if all its members must strictly gain by deviating from the status quo15. This completes the
specication of the rules of the game.
We solve for the extensive-form game of enfranchisement and voting by backward induction.
4 Ex-post bargaining
We begin our formal analysis by analyzing the outcomes of the bargaining subgame. At the
nal step of the bargaining subgame, there is bilateral bargaining between a pair of classes over
13 If there is more than one sharing rule with the highest number of votes, then each sharing rule in set of sharing
rules with the highest number of votes is selected with equal probability.
14 It is perhaps useful to notice the coup in this model des not necessarily implies a civil war since there is still
room for bargaining. In the real word, this is usually called bloodless coup.
15One way to justify the "only if" part of the assumption is that each class in a coalition must bear an arbi-
trarily small but positive cost of coalition formation. The "if" part of the assumption rules out the possibility of
coordination failure at the coalition formation stage.
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the available surplus. In the penultimate step, either there continues to be bilateral bargaining
between a pair of classes over the available surplus or a coalition of classes bargain with an isolated
class over the available surplus. Anticipating the outcomes of these two stages, there is a coalition
formation stage and once coalition formation (if any) is taken into account, the portion of the
social surplus Y that each class can grab for itself is xed.
No enfranchisement
We begin our analysis of the bargaining subgame when, at t = 0, there is no enfranchisement.
Fix  = i. Note that in any bilateral bargain with Ej , j 6= i, andW , Ei is always the proposer while
Ej is the proposer in the bilateral bargain withW . If s is the available surplus, conditional on  =
i, Ei makes an o¤er exactly equal to sdfEjg;fEig (i) to Ej , j 6= i (and keeps s

1  ~dfEjg;fEig (i)

)
while both Ei and Ej o¤er W nothing and gets to keep the whole of s. When a coalition of two
classes bargains with an individual class, fEi; Ejg o¤ers W nothing and gets to keep the whole of
s, the coalition fEi;Wg o¤ers Ej s ~dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i) (and keeps s

1  ~dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i)

) while the
coalition fEj ;Wg o¤ers Ei s ~dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i) < s2 (and keeps s

1  ~dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

> s2). If no
coalition of two classes form, there are two possible sequences of bilateral bargains between pairs
of individual classes, namely, (i) fEig ; fEjg followed by fEig ; fWg, (ii) fEig ; fWg followed by
fEig ; fEjg. In both these sequences, W always gets nothing while Ei gets Y

1  ~dfEjg;fEig (i)

while Ej , j 6= i, gets Y ~dfEjg;fEig (i). Next, (i) if the coalition fEi; Ejg forms, then Ei gets
Y

1  ~dfEjg;fEig (i)

while Ej , j 6= i, gets Y ~dfEjg;fEig (i) whileW gets nothing, (ii) if the coalition
fEi;Wg forms, Ej gets Y ~dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i), Ei gets Y

1  ~dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i)

andW gets nothing, (iii)
if the coalition fEj ;Wg forms, Ei gets Y ~dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i) < Y2 , Ej gets Y

1  ~dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

> Y2
and W gets nothing.
Therefore, for any value of , W never (strictly) gains (relative to bilateral bargaining between
pairs of individual classes) by forming a coalition with either E1 or E2. Moreover, for any value
of , neither do E1 or E2 (strictly) gain by forming a coalition against W . It follows that, without
enfranchisement, no coalitions form in the bargaining subgame.
Enfranchisement
Next, we turn to the analysis of the bargaining subgame when, at t = 0, there is en-
franchisement. Fix  = i. As before, note that in any bilateral bargain with Ej , j 6= i,
and W , Ei is always the proposer while Ej is the proposer in the bilateral bargain with W .
If s is the available surplus, Ei makes an o¤er exactly equal to sdfEjg;fEig (i) to Ej , j 6= i
(and keeps s

1  dfEjg;fEig (i)

) while Ei o¤ers W nothing and gets to keep the whole of s.
Now, however, if s is the available surplus, Ej , j 6= i, makes an o¤er sdfWg;fEjg (i) to W
(and keeps s

1  dfWg;fEjg (i)

). As before, when a coalition of two classes bargains with
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an individual class, fEi; Ejg o¤ers W nothing and gets to keep the whole of s, the coalition
fEi;Wg o¤ers Ej sdfEi;Wg;fEjg (i) (and keeps s

1  dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i)

) while the coalition coali-
tion fEj ;Wg o¤ers Ei sdfEj ;Wg;fEig (i) < s2 (and keeps s

1  dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

> s2). If no
coalition of two classes form, as before, in both the two possible sequences, W always gets
nothing while Ei gets Y

1  dfEjg;fEig (i)

while Ej , j 6= i, gets Y dfEjg;fEig (i). Next, (i)
if the coalition fEi; Ejg forms, as before Ei gets Y

1  dfEjg;fEig (i)

while Ej , j 6= i, gets
Y dfEjg;fEig (i) whileW gets nothing, (ii) if the coalition fEi;Wg forms, Ej gets Y dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i),
Ei gets Y

1  dfEi;Wg;fEjg (i)

and W gets nothing, (iii) if the coalition fEj ;Wg forms, Ei
gets Y dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i) <
Y
2 , Ej gets Y

1  dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

1  dfWg;fEjg (i)

> Y2 and W gets
Y

1  dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

dfWg;fEjg (i).
Therefore, for any value of , W and the weaker elite both (strictly) gain (relative to bilateral
bargaining between pairs of individual classes) by forming a coalition with each other and neither
have an incentive to form a coalition with the stronger elite. It follows that, with enfranchisement,
W and the weaker elite form a coalition in the bargaining subgame and no other coalition forms.
Some more notation is necessary now. For Ei, i = 1; 2, and W , let c(Ei; ) and c(W; ) (re-
spectively, ~c(Ei; ) and ~c(W; ) without enfranchisement) denote the portion of the social surplus
that class i obtains by participating in the bargaining subgame. We call the functions c(:; ) and
~c(:; ) grab functions. Let c1 = Y dfEjg;fEig (i), c2 = Y

1  dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

1  dfWg;fEjg (i)

and c0 = Y

1  dfEj ;Wg;fEig (i)

dfWg;fEjg (i). Under assumptions 3 and 5, there exists " > 0
but closed to zero such that d;0() < " and ~d;0() < ". It follows that there exists ~" > 0 but
close to zero such that c1 < ~" and c0 < ~".
The following proposition describes the outcomes of the bargaining subgame:
Lemma 1 Under assumptions (1)-(5), (i) without enfranchisement, no coalitions form in the
bargaining subgame and (a) ~c(E1; 2) = ~c(E2; 1) = c1, (b) ~c(W; ) = 0,  = 1; 2, and (c) ~c(E1; 1) =
~c(E2; 2) = Y   c1; (ii) with enfranchisement, W always forms a coalition with the weaker elite
against the stronger elite and (a) Y > c(E1; 2) = c(E2; 1) = c2   c0 > Y2 , (b) c(W; ) = c0,
 = 1; 2, and (c) c(E1; 1) = c(E2; 2) = Y   c2   c0; (iii) c2 + c1 < Y .
5 Interim majority voting
The subgame at t = 1 without enfranchisement
Without loss of generality, consider the case when  = 1: We demonstrate that along the
equilibrium path of play, the winning proposal is E1 = Y  c1, E2 = c1, W = 0 and no coalition
of classes will reject the proposal. Given lemma 1, it is evident that on their own, neither E1 nor
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E2 can do better by rejecting the winning proposal. Can E2 do better by building a coalition
with W? Note that coalition fE2;Wg can grab c2 and therefore, on the face of it, E2 has an
incentive to build a coalition with W and reject the winning proposal. What about Ws incentive
to join a deviating coalition with E2? Whatever be Ws signal, as c(W; ) = 0, for  = 1; E2 will
appropriate c2 and leave nothing for W . But, then, W will have no incentive to deviate with E2.
Finally, note that any proposal with E2 > c1 will be rejected by E1 as E1 can grab Y   c1 on
her own and further, any proposal with E2 < c1 will be rejected by E2 as E2 can grab Y   c1 on
her own. A symmetric argument establishes that when  = 2, along any equilibrium path of play,
the winning proposal is E1 = c1, E2 = Y   c1, W = 0 and moreover, no coalition of classes will
reject the proposal. Therefore we have the following result:
Lemma 2 Without enfranchisement, if  = 1, the sharing rule E1 = Y   c1, E2 = c1, W = 0
is the equilibrium outcome; while if  = 2, the sharing rule E1 = c1, E2 = Y   c1, W = 0 is
the equilibrium outcome.
The subgame at t = 1 when W is enfranchised
Again without loss of generality x  = 1. W observes a noisy signal s and conditional on
observing s, believes that  = 1with probability q > 12 and  = 2 with probability 1   q < 12 .
There are two cases to consider: (i) in the ex-post renegotiation game, no coalition of classes has
an incentive to reject W 0s winning proposal and (ii) in the ex-post renegotiation game, either E1
or some other coalition of classes or has an incentive to reject W 0s winning proposal.
Consider case (i). In this case, we claim that the best-response o¤er by W is E1 = E2 =
Y   c2, W = 2c2   Y . The argument proceeds as follows. Under the constraints that no
coalition of classes has an incentive to rejectWs proposal,Ws proposal must satisfy the following
(in)equalities:
 z =
(Y   "z)
2
with z = E1; E2
W = "E2 + "E1
where "z, z = E1; E2 is such that
Y   c1  Y   "z
2
 Y   c2
"E2 + "E1  c0;
As c2 > Y2 > c1 and c0 is close to 0, the above inequalities are mutually consistent. Since
Y "E1
2  Y   c2, class E1 will never deviate alone. Moreover, W will never form a deviating
coalition with the elites as following any deviation W will obtain maximum c0 < W . While
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W will accept to form coalition only with the weakest elite, say E2; if E1 rejects the proposal,
and grab c0 > 0 in the bilateral post-coalition bargain against E2. On the other hand, W will
never accept any counter proposal of forming a coalition with E1 since W will get 0 in this case.
Finally E2 will never form a deviating coalition with E1 as following any deviation E2 will only
obtain c1  Y "E22 : In equilibrium, "z, z = E1; E2, will satisfy Y "z2 = Y   c2 or equivalently,
"z = 2c2   Y: Therefore, in equilibrium, E1 = E2 = Y   c2, W = 2c2   Y .
Next, consider the situation when Ws is rejected with positive probability by some deviating
coalition. Note thatW will never make an o¤er that is rejected by both E2 and E1 with probability
one. Now suppose that, s = 1 and that W "bets" on  = 1 and makes an o¤er that is not rejected
by E1 on her own. It follows that c2 is the maximum portion of social surplus that E1 is willing
to give up as otherwise E1 can reject Ws proposal and obtain Y   c2, by bargaining against the
coalition W and E2: Moreover, c1 is the minimum amount W will o¤er to E2 as otherwise, E2
will have an incentive to form a deviating coalition with E1. It follows that Ws proposal will be
E1 = Y   c2, E2 = c1 and W = c2  c1 and moreover, with probability q no coalition of classes
will reject this proposal. On the other hand, with probability 1   q,  = 2. In this case, E2 will
reject Ws proposal. Note that after Ws o¤er is rejected, E2 -in coalition with W - anticipates
that E1 will reject any o¤er less than c2   c0. and therefore, propose the outcome E1 = c2   c0,
E2 = Y   c2, W = c0.
Call E1 = E2 = Y   c2, W = 2c2   Y "Fair Sharing" and E1 = Y   c2, E2 = c1,
W = c2   c1 "bet on the winner". We have the following result:
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, W prefers "fair sharing" to "bet on the winner" if and only if:
u(2c2   Y ) > qu (c2   c1) + (1  q)u (c0) : (2)
6 Ex-ante enfranchisement
Recall that c0 is close to 0. As c1 < Y   c2 and Y2 < c2 , it follows that u(2c2   Y ) < u (c2   c1).
Therefore, whenever q = 1, W will prefer to "bet on the winner". However, since
1
2
u(Y   c2) + 1
2
u(c1) <
1
2
u(Y   c1) + 1
2
u(c1);
whenW prefers "bet on the winner", ex-ante the elites will not enfranchiseW: Therefore, we have
the following result:
Proposition 4 There exists q < 1, such that when q > q, W is never enfranchised.
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Proof. If follows directly from the discussion in the text and from the condition (2) by setting q
to be the unique solution to the equation u(2c2   Y ) = qu (c2   c1) + (1   q)u (c0) and noticing
that the expression qu (c2   c1) + (1  q)u (c0) is increasing (and continuous) in q.
When W has precise information about the realization of ; it is not possible for Ej , j 6= i, to
insure against the outcome  = i because W will always prefer to "bet on the winner" i.e. favor
Ei.
In contrast, next, consider a situation where W 0s signal is imprecise i.e. q < q. In this case,
W prefers "fair sharing" as a now
u(2c2   Y ) > qu(c2   c1) + (1  q)u(c0) (3)
and therefore, with enfranchisement, both E1 and E2 obtain Y   c2 while W obtains 2c2   Y .
Recall that c2   c1 > 2c2   Y and 2c2   Y > c0. It follows that (3) is always satised for a
su¢ ciently high level of concavity of u(); hence, as far as individuals are su¢ cienlty risk averse.
When (3) holds, ex-ante the elites E1 and E2 will always extend the franchise if
u(Y   c2) > 1
2
u(Y   c1) + 1
2
u(c1): (4)
Note that given lemma 1, under our assumptions, when u00(:) = 0 (with risk-neutral preferences)
there will never be enfranchisement as in this case, 4 becomes (Y   c2) > 12Y , which is never
satised because c2 > Y2 . However, given lemma 1, under our assumptions, Y   c1 > Y   c2 > c1
. Accordingly, by continuity, there will be a degree of concavity of u(:) such that 4 is satised.
Therefore, both conditions (3) and (4) are satised for a su¢ ciently high level of risk aversion.
Indeed, if we consider the CRRA class of utility function, u(x) = x
1 
1  ,  6= 1, by computation,
it is easily veried that for any q < q; there exists , 0 <  < 1, such that whenever  > ,
 6= 1, there is enfranchisement in equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the above
discussion:
Proposition 5 If W is su¢ cienlty uninformed, i.e. q < q, and when individuals are su¢ ciently
risk averse, E1 and E2 will always enfranchise W .
We conclude this section by examining whether our enfranchisement result is robust to re-
peated interaction between competing elites. On the face of it, folk theorem type arguments
suggest that repeated interaction between competing elites, without franchise extension to non-
elites, should lead to e¢ cient risk sharing between elites. However, there are atleast two reasons
why a folk theorem type argument may not apply here. First, the discount factor may be bounded
away from one because, for instance, the gap between successive rounds of play (in our model,
13
without enfranchisement, a round of play would have an ex-ante stage and ex-post stage of coali-
tion formation and bargaining) is large. Second, the strategy proles that support risk-sharing
between elites may not be renegotiation-proof. Indeed, in our paper, there is a single e¢ cient
risk-sharing allocation between the two elites namely that at each value of , each elite apropri-
ates half the social surplus in each round of play and . Notice that for a strategy prole to be
renegotiation proof, it would have to result in the e¢ cient allocation after any history of play.
However, any strategy prole that supports e¢ cient risk-sharing along the equilibrium path of
play must involve some payo¤ loss for the stronger elite in the continuation game that follows on
from the history where the stronger elite reneges on e¢ cient risk-sharing, a contradiction.
7 Public goods, surplus sharing and enfranchisement
In this section, we extend our model to allow for public good provision and examine whether
enfranchisement leads to public good provision.
We assume, for simplicity, that the entire surplus Y must be invested in order to obtain the
public good or there is no production of the public good. The location of the public good is
indexed by points in R2+ in gure 1. Each individual class E1, E2 and W has an ideal point over
the location of the public good so that the ideal point for E1 is (0; 0), the ideal point for E2 is
(l; 0) and the ideal point of W is (
lp
2
;
lp
2
), with l < G: Where we assumed for simplicity that
the three classes have the same distance E2 among each other (i.e. the triangle (E1; E2;W ) is
equilateral).16
Let j:j denote the Euclidian distance between two points. If the public good is located at a
point l 2 R2+, let the preferences of the three classes are described by the utility functions
vE1(G; l) = v(G  jlj)
vE2(G; l) = v(G 
l   (l; 0))
vW (G; l) = v

G 
l   ( lp2 ; lp2)
 :
where v0(:) > 0 and v00(:) < 0.
Let  < 12 denote the proportion of each elite in the population. Under the assumption that
for the public good to be produced, the entire surplus Y must be invested, at the voting stage, a
proposal is either a sharing rule (E1 ; E2 ; W ) or a location l for the public good. At the ex-post
bargaining stage, if either the stronger elite or a coalition of a pair of classes objects, the public
16As far as W is equidistant from both E1 and E2 i.e. the triangle is isosceles, the solution will not change
qualitatively.
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good is never provided and the classes obtain their disagreement utility exactly as in section 4. It
follows that using the grab functions c(; ) we can derive a grabbing function over the location
the public good, (; ), where (; ) is the maximum distance the public good can be located
from the ideal point of class  consistent with ex-post bargaining, is given by the equation
u

c(; )


= v(G  (; ))
Now consider the voting stage and assume for simplicity that the signal  is not revealing for
class W or q = 12 . At this stage, W has a choice between proposing a location for the public good
or proposing the surplus sharing rule E1 = E2 = Y   c2, W = 2c2 Y . Moreover, any location
l proposed by W must have the property that both the following inequalities
v (G  jlj)  u

Y   c2


v
 
G  l   (l; 0)  uY   c2


are satised as otherwise with probability 12 , the stronger elite will renegotiate the voting outcome
and in this case, as we saw in the previous section W will not bet on the winner and it
will be better o¤ by proposing the surplus sharing rule. For any l, that satises the equation
v (G  jlj) = u  Y c2 . Using gure 1, we can notice that l   (l; 0) is minimized for l^ such thatl^   (l; 0) = l   l^. By computation, it follows that
v

G 
l^   (l; 0)
= v

2G  l   v 1u

Y   c2


and therefore, whenever
l > 2

G  v 1u

Y   c2


it must be the case that
u

Y   c2


> v

G 
l^   (l; 0) :
Note that this continues to be true even when both inequalities v
 
G  l > u2c2 Y1 2  and
u
 
Y c1


> v (G) hold i.e. when W prefers the public good (at any location) to surplus sharing
and in the absence of enfranchisement, no public good is ever supplied.
We summarize the above discussion by the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If the distance between the ideal points over the location of the public good id
su¢ ciently large, i.e. l > 2
 
G  v 1u  Y c2  enfranchisement will not result in public good
provision.
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8 A comparative analysis of Indian Democracy
In this section, we provide some descriptive and anecdotal evidence showing that our model is
able to capture the distinctive features of Indian democracy, and we compare India with other
countries, whose institutions did not achieve the same level of stability.
India is the worlds biggest and one of its more stable democracies. In the more than 50 years
since the rst election, there have been 15 general elections and over 300 state contests. Both at
state level and at the centre, governments have always been elected by people with a reasonably
high level of rotation among political parties17. As has been extensively documented, India enjoys
a free media, freedom of assembly and association.
The decision to extend the franchise was voted unanimously by the constituent assembly, which
also declared India an Independent state. The constituent assembly was elected via a process of
indirect elections, chosen by provincial legislatures that had been elected in early 1946, by a pool
of 10 percent of the entire population (Sarkar 2001). In this sense, the constituent assembly can
be considered to be representative of the elites and franchise extension in India was a one-shot
decision rather than a dynamic process.
A non redistributive democracy
The success of Indian democracy came in spite the low income, widespread poverty and illit-
eracy and immense ethnic diversity. However, consistent with our results, Indian democracy did
very little to increase the living standard of the majority. As Weiner notes:
The incorporation into the political system of backward caste elites and members of scheduled
castes has apparently done little to reduce the enormous social and economic disparities that persist
in Indias hierarchical and inegalitarian social order. That rise the fundamental question: if there
are now so many OBC and scheduled castes bureaucrats and politicians, why is not reected in
state policies to promote the well being of their communities? (...) Why has the increase in political
power for members of the lower castes done so little to raise these communities?(Weiner (2001)
p.p. 211)
Weiners observations are supported by Figure 2, depicting the index of wealth concentration
and relative poverty in India from 1946- the date of the constituent assembly, which allowed for
universal su¤rage- to the early 1990s.18 We can observe that income inequality and relative poverty
17Although the Congress has traditionally been the dominating force, in 1977 it is thrown out. In 1980 it was
voted back, although in 1989 elections it was voted out again. In 1991, the Congress came back to power again.
18Gini index and last income quintile: Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset. GDP per capita growth:
Penn Table.
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hardly present any downward tend, in spite of often positive growth rates.19 No redistribution
clearly took place: the Gini Index of wealth concentration, changed from 35 in 1951 to 32 in 1991;
20 altogether, the funds allocated for the three main antipoverty programs constituted only the
4% of the total allocation in the plan where this project took place.21
Furthermore, in gure 2 we can observe very little evidence of education provision; there is
very low level of education characterizing the Indian population in 1960, 11 years after the rst
election, and only a marginal decrease until 1990. The share of individuals above 25 years that
completed the rst level passed from 6.3% in 1960 to only 8.5% in 1990, while the ones without
any schooling changed from 75% in 1960 to 60% in the 1990.22 Moreover there is a widespread
consensus that level of health care is persistently neglected in many part of India. Always in this
respect, Sen (1995) notes:
If we were to look back at what has happened in India in the rst four decades of planned
development, two general failures appear particularly glaring. First, in contrast with what was
promised by the political leadership which took India to independence, very little has been achieved
in "the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity" the "tasks
ahead" that Jawaharlal Nehru identied in his famous speech on the eve of independence, on
August 14th 1947. Four decades of allegedly "interventionist" planning did little to make the
country literate, provide a wide-based health service, achieve comprehensive land reforms, or end
the rampant social inequalities that blight the material prospects of the underprivileged.
We can therefore argue that there is little evidence of public good provision that improved
non-elite well being after the enfranchisement.
19Recently, in the early 2000s, we started to observe a decline in the poverty rate, but this is due to trickle
downgrowth, rather than to wealth redistribution.
20Deininger and Squire, High quality Dataset.
21Brass 1990.
22Barro and Lee Dataset.
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Distribution of power between the elites
At the onset of the constituent assembly, the elites were constituted by large landowners and
the industrial urban class often in conict within each other. The uncertainty on their respective
e¤ective power is amplied by social, religious and as well as regional divisions. The caste system
was an institutional way to organize this fragmentation, but at the same time, it perpetrated
these divisions. These divisions were already present in the Moguls era but they were further
exacerbated by the English rulers, who implemented the policy of "divide and rule", trying to
prevent the formation of any coalition that could represent a threat (Moore 1966).
In this respect India di¤ered from both Imperial China and Tzarist Russia, as they were both
characterized by a strong central power. Even more remarkable is the comparison between India
with Pakistan, due to their geographic proximity and their common past as British colonies.
In contrast with India, Pakistan is characterized by an overwhelming Sunni Muslim Punjabi-
speaking elite23. Although the creation of Pakistani democracy was contemporaneous with Indian
23Until 1971, the presence of a Bengali-muslim population in Pakistan generated a conict with the west Pakistani
majority, but their political power has always been small (Rashiduzzaman 1982). In 1971, the Bengali minority,
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democracy, it has never been stable with four major military coups (1958, 1969, 1977, 1999).
Composition of the non elites
The fragmentation of low classes in India mirrors the ones of the elites, and also in this
respect Indian society is di¤erent from China and Russia, where the lower classes had less marked
social and linguistic divisions, and for this reason were more easily organized as a revolutionary
power. A proof of this political weakness is represented by the general weakness of the communist
parties in India. They have never been strong at a central level, and, when they gained some
representativity at local level, like in the West Bengal, they have always supported moderate
policies of redistribution rather than dramatic change in the economic system (Moore 1966).
Therefore, we can argue that Indian lower classes would never be able to have an high level of
bargaining power, (i.e. dfWg;0 () = 0 and very little information on ):
In spite of their sociopolitical di¤erences, the degree of ethnic conict in India has always been
less serious than in African countries, and it is conceivable that the non elites can potentially ally
together against the elites, irrespectively of their ethnic origin. The fact that the Congress party
and the coalition of parties in power at the central government during the di¤erent legislatures
are not organized on an ethnic basis (Horowitz 1985) supports this claim. This is a fundamental
precondition for our model, where we assumed that the non-elites W acts together. If a part of
W belonged to the same groups that the stronger elite, say Ei, then it may have an incentive to
ally with i because of the ethnic identity, rather than oppose it and ally with the rest of W in
both voting and bargaining24.
The lower level of inter-ethnic conict in Indian society is perhaps due to the geographic
dispersion of Indian ethnic groups. On the contrary, when di¤erent ethnic groups are concentrated
in the di¤erent region of the country, it is much more likely that the non-elites will not ally
horizontally within each other, but prefer to ally vertically with the elites of the same group. The
ethnical characterization of the Southern African parties provides a support to this argument.
In Nigeria, for example, after independence three essentially ethnic parties had emerged: the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) drawing its support from the Hausa and Fulani tribes of the
North, the Action Group (AG), drawing its support from the Yoruba tribes of Western Nigeria,
and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) relying on the support of the
Ibo of Eastern Nigeria. In this political panorama it is hard to imagine a unied non-elite that,
rst, does not bet on the winner after the enfranchisement and, second, turns compact against
with the help of India, obtained their independence with the formation of Bangladesh.
24Or, more materialistically, the power of commitment represented by the social linkages allows the stronger elite
to credibly promise some surplus to every member of their same ethnic group, dividing in that way W:
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the prevailing elites if this mounts a coup.
In this respect, the two following episodes describing an attempt of coup in India and a
successful coup in Nigeria seems to support our results. In India, Indira Gandhi used the promise
of alleviating poverty to burst her popularity and concentrate the power in her person. This
culminated when Indira Gandhi had the then president Faqr ud dub Ali Ahmed, declare a national
emergency, which was clearly unconstitutional since this proclamation was not discussed by council
ministers (Rudolph and Rudolph (2001)). After this act Gandhi lost her enormous popular
support and in the need of conrm her legitimacy she called and lost elections in 1977.25 In
terms of our model Indira Gandhi sought the alliance of the non elites to disenfranchise the other
parties by promising more distribution, but this commitment was not credible and the non elites
preferred the alliances with the other party. As already Kohli (2001) notes: "The fact that she
was voted out of power following the emergency only conrm the e¢ cacy of Indian democracy"
The rst elections held in Nigeria in 1959 saw the victory of the NPC which after one year
declared the state of emergency in the western region whose local government, leaded by the AG,
was proscribed and its leader arrested. Far from rejecting this outcome and turning compact
against the NPC, the lower classes split along the ethnic and geographic lines, which lead the
country to a long civil war that lasted until 1970 (Ake 1985).
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